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Reliable and cost-effective monitoring of rural water supply infrastructure has 
long been hampered by the geographical curse of dispersed and low-income 
populations, and weak institutional performance. Recent advances in 
monitoring technology combined with mobile network expansion into rural 
areas has created an opportunity to bypass these seemingly intractable 
challenges. Mobile-enhanced technologies have the potential to produce data 
that is orders of magnitude richer, faster, and cheaper than that provided by 
traditional monitoring methods, which require costly field visits. However, 
more data does not equate to better data; information generated by crowd-
sourced and automated systems each has its respective limitations. We 
propose a framework for analysing monitoring and surveillance systems, 
which can help assess the strengths and weaknesses of different emerging 
approaches. We suggest that these advancements present an opportunity to 
fundamentally change the way we consider and conduct rural water supply 
monitoring.
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If you can’t measure It, you can’t manage it. So true, yet so elusive in so 
many sectors, perhaps none more so than for rural water supply where 
investments have long eluded objective outcome metrics. Four out of 
five of those who still lack improved water supplies are rural dwellers 
in the developing world (JMP, 2012), leading to well-documented 
health and welfare impacts on rural populations. With the chances 
of objectively monitoring outcomes of rural water investments over 
time close to zero, ensuring that the scarce resources available for 
rural water are used cost-effectively to achieve sustainable impacts 
remains a challenge, especially when the sector must compete with 
other development priorities, such as health or education.
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Recent advances in monitoring rural water supplies, which take 
advantage of mobile network expansion, create an opportunity to 
bypass the institutional challenges posed by the highly dispersed 
nature of rural water infrastructure. Emerging evidence indicates that 
these advances provide a more encouraging basis for the evaluation 
of the performance and delivery of rural water services than the 
costly and infrequent field visits required by traditional monitoring 
methods. We propose a framework for analysing monitoring and 
surveillance systems, and how this can be applied in a rural water 
supply context. While the availability of cheaper, faster, and more 
reliable monitoring data afforded by new technologies is only one 
of many elements required to achieve sustainable water services, 
understanding the respective strengths and weaknesses of the novel 
approaches currently being developed is essential if they are to deliver 
the transformative benefits that they offer.
Monitoring benefits from the digital dividend 
The mobile phone network is essentially information-transfer infra-
structure, whether voice, SMS, or data services. Rapid growth in 
mobile network coverage and cheaper communications technologies 
have led to an upsurge in monitoring innovations in energy, finance, 
biodiversity, agriculture, and water. The digital dividend is generating 
multiple and unanticipated benefits; low-income groups are able to 
participate owing to increasingly low entry barriers, with the low 
cost of basic mobile handsets and growing network coverage. This is 
not just an urban story as mobile operators are now focusing more 
attention on the untapped market in rural areas. Villages that lack 
certain basic infrastructure elements, such as electricity or sanitation, 
now have GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications) coverage, 
providing the rural population with new opportunities for commu-
nication and commerce. With mobile network coverage expected to 
reach 90 per cent of Africa by 2014 if current growth rates continue 
(World Bank, 2010), the rural water sector is embracing opportu-
nities to overcome its geographic disadvantage of remote, small, and 
dispersed settlement patterns. This coverage now reaches into areas 
currently reliant on handpumps for their water supply, the same areas 
currently struggling to maintain those handpumps on a sustainable 
basis. As well as the existing benefits mobile coverage brings to these 
areas, it also has the potential to be the means by which the ‘objective, 
reliable and detailed information about water access’, called for by 
Jimenéz and Pérez-Fouget (2010), can be transmitted and distributed. 
Many innovative approaches use the mobile network architecture 
for enhanced monitoring and evaluation (M&E) often using GIS 
Advances in 
monitoring rural 
water supplies take 
advantage of mobile 
network expansion




as electricity or 
sanitation, now 
have GSM coverage
282 P. THOMSON ET AL.
October 2012 Waterlines Vol. 31 No. 4
data, which allows information to be presented in an intuitive, 
spatial, and user-friendly manner. With mobile phone penetration 
reaching around one in two adults in rural Africa (Hope et al., 2012a), 
monitoring systems using mobile handsets are now a real option for 
rural water services. There are numerous examples of this in both 
urban and rural contexts, including Manobi’s mWater in West Africa, 
the H2.0 initiative in Zanzibar, NextDrop in India, m-Maji in Kenya, 
Daraja’s Maji Matone in Tanzania, Mobile4Water in Uganda, and Water 
SMS in Indonesia – to name but a few. While a detailed examination 
of these programmes is beyond the scope of this paper, and can be 
found elsewhere (e.g. Hutchings et al., 2012), it is helpful to note how 
these monitoring approaches differ in design and purpose. Some rely 
on end-users to collect and transmit water service information, while 
others are dependent on the service providers themselves. In crowd-
sourced systems (e.g. Maji Matone, Mobile4Water) end-users act as 
monitoring agents to alert authorities or service providers to acute 
operational problems. Others instead rely on field staff, delegated 
operators or vendors to collect and transmit the data (e.g. NextDrop, 
m-Maji, Manobi). These variations are borne out of the different 
objectives that have inspired the development of the systems. In the 
Tanzanian cases of Daraja and H2.0, fault reporting is intended to 
spur prompt corrective action from the local authorities by dissem-
inating the information widely, including through the media. The 
operators who subscribe to Manobi’s service in West Africa seemingly 
submit information for national reporting and regulatory purposes. 
Meanwhile, the information submitted to the m-Maji and NextDrop 
databases is intended to aid customers in their purchasing and water 
use decisions.
Where users have access to mobile monitoring and have the right 
incentives to engage, crowd-sourcing is a credible and new way to shift 
from external and expensive snapshot monitoring to one of low-cost 
continuous monitoring. Notwithstanding the nascent nature of the 
above-mentioned systems, some common challenges have begun 
to surface. Some systems opting for this approach have found it 
difficult to mobilize end-users to report problems to local authorities. 
Socio-demographic barriers, such as literacy and familiarity with 
SMS, as well as entrenched political interests, have been identified. 
Low levels of participation may also be quite a rational response to 
the perceived likelihood of any corrective action being taken by a 
service provider or local authority. Where crowd-sourcing approaches 
prove unreliable, mobile technologies which automate data flows 
may provide an alternative to monitor cheaply, objectively, and 
universally. Understanding the risks and limitations of monitoring 
methods for rural water supply is essential to make appropriate policy 
and investment choices. 
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Risks and limitations of monitoring methods
One of the risks that comes with the power of information technology 
to generate unprecedented volumes of data is for the user to be able 
to understand how compelling outputs are related to the quality and 
selective choice of the primary data. While high-quality analysis and 
presentation of data is invaluable, it can only be genuinely helpful 
if we understand what the underlying data represent and their 
limitations. The quality of the raw source data must be considered, in 
terms of both accuracy and timeliness. Data that is out of date may 
be of little use, no matter how accurate it was. As important as the 
analysis of what it is telling us is the analysis of what it is not telling 
us, and what we should or should not infer from that. 
Figure 1 shows a structured way of looking at any form of monitoring 
where the primary aim is to know if a system is working or not.
The vertical axis has system performance split into binary states 
of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ and the horizontal axis has, at its extremes, 
continuous monitoring and a complete lack of monitoring. The 
middle state of ‘Intermittent’ can apply to either a system that has a 
strict and known regime of monitoring, e.g. checks every six month, 
or a system that is subject to potentially continuous monitoring 
but is known to be unreliable or inaccurate. Traditional systems of 
monitoring rural water projects using shoe leather and diesel will be 
towards the right of this figure, at best intermittent and in many cases 
non-existent as the location of pumps, wells, and tanks are forgotten 
or the costs of reaching them become impractical.
The dog that doesn’t bark
An effective monitoring system would be alert to all credible problems 
and notify maintenance responses in a timely and consistent manner. 
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Figure 1 System performance and monitoring/reporting
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In the same way we might assume that our guard dog is alert, but 
cannot be sure that he is in fact asleep, we may have intermittent or 
unreliable fault monitoring, so we cannot be sure of a system’s status. 
As stated earlier, crowd-sourcing techniques assume that people 
have the right incentives to call in faults when performance drops 
below a certain level. Where incentives, behaviour, and responses to 
alerts are aligned, this approach is likely to be cost-effective. For rural 
handpumps, which are used by different people in different ways at 
different times, and where those responsible for maintenance may 
have a chequered history of accountability, it is unclear whether 
simply ‘empowering’ people to report failures will deliver the reliable 
and timely information needed to support governments’ efforts 
to deliver universal and continuous supplies of safe water to their 
citizens. In describing the various challenges of maintaining water 
systems in rural Malawi, Kleemeier (2000) notes that users undermine 
a system’s performance by failing to report faults, even when a 
credible reporting mechanism is in place, and that such inaction can 
be as damaging as wilful vandalism.
As the Maji Matone project in Tanzania reported in 2012 on a 
trial of ‘crowd-sourcing’ handpump failures, systems relying on user 
feedback are not purely technical, and reside within existing social 
and political structures. Strengthening ‘agency’ without under-
standing existing ‘structures’ addresses only part of the inevitable 
and uneven interplay between social practices and processes. Where 
crowd-sourcing may either challenge or inadequately address existing 
and established social norms and power relations, a system that is 
well-designed technically may still under-perform. Daraja discusses 
these challenges in its admirably self-reflexive blog (Daraja, 2012). 
In these cases we know that there is the potential for the system to be 
monitored, but we do not know if it is actually being monitored, and 
therefore the assumption that ‘no news is good news’ is a dangerous 
one. As such, crowd-sourcing methods can only be viewed as inter-
mittent reporting mechanisms that report failures only.
Also, when users are responsible for reporting faults careful consid-
eration should be made of which sub-groups of users may or may not 
be reporting. The communities least likely to be able to maintain their 
water systems without outside support in the first place may well be 
the least likely to effectively use a new type of reporting system. As 
a result even as average metrics for performance and fault reporting 
may increase, the most vulnerable communities who are most in 
need of outside assistance may remain the least well served.
A slightly different situation arises where the official definition 
of whether a system is functioning well does not coincide with the 
users’ implicit definition, or there is a range of performance which 
is below the standard it should be but not low enough to warrant 
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users to complain about it. In the case of a truck fleet with ‘How is 
my driving? Call this number’ signs on the back of their vehicles, 
the managers of this fleet probably only get called when one of their 
drivers has made a display of spectacularly inconsiderate driving, way 
over the line between good and bad. A slow deterioration of water 
pressure in a piped system to a state where it works, but works only 
badly may not induce any complaint from the users. While it can 
be argued that it is the users who should be the ultimate arbiters 
of whether a system is functioning well, the health and economic 
impacts of low, but ‘acceptable’ water quality and quantity may be 
significant. From an economic point of view there may be a societal 
cost being incurred from this deteriorating performance even if the 
water users are acting rationally from a personal point of view by not 
flagging a fault. 
Automated monitoring systems may theoretically overcome some 
of the shortcomings inherent in crowd-sourced approaches but also 
have limitations. They can simply break: for example communication 
is lost or a sensor becomes fixed in a certain state, and this may not 
be apparent from the data being received. They also rely on certain 
features being set at the design stage and thus rely on the expertise 
of the designers and the effectiveness of the design process in taking 
into account potential operational and failure state. A failure may be 
defined at the design stage as, for example, a certain water pressure 
at which the system raises an alarm and maintenance or corrective 
action is undertaken. However, users may face problems before this 
point is reached, but those managing the system do not realize this, 
and so from the point of view of the users, the system is failing and 
nothing is being done about it. In this situation the likelihood of 
damage to the system by ad hoc repairs, get-arounds, or straight 
vandalism is increased and thus the system can enter a downward 
spiral of performance and trust between the service provider and 
customers (Rouse, 2007). 
Waterpoint mapping techniques and more advanced systems, such 
as Akvo FLOW (Field Level Operations Watch) originally developed 
by Water For People, have a different limitation, which does have 
the advantage of being known and explicit. While they provide a 
significant amount of information, this is just for one snapshot in 
time. As time moves on from the snapshot the likelihood of the data 
remaining valid diminishes. Inferences about the system’s function-
ality can be made if the data generated is combined with historical 
system statistics. These inferences may be quite accurate and may 
provide a very good average picture of a system with many similar 
elements, for example a large network of handpumps. However, 
there will be little confidence in predicting the status of an individual 
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be an incident reporting system (Cohen, 2012), so the danger here 
can be one of misunderstanding a system’s purpose rather than an 
inherent flaw in the system itself. While these are invaluable tools 
for conducting baseline and periodic assessments of rural water 
infrastructure, to view them as an effective monitoring tool for the 
surveillance of individual systems is problematic, unless frequent and 
reliable updates can be guaranteed.
Measuring performance rather than flagging failure
For systems where there are simple binary conditions of working or 
not working, and where we are confident that our monitoring system 
will flag a failure, either automatically or through user feedback, 
active monitoring while the system is working well may not be 
necessary. If no fault is flagged, the system must be working. Crowd-
sourcing solutions generally make this assumption either implicitly or 
explicitly, and this assumption may well be correct, although it may 
not be, as discussed previously. While this may be good for reporting 
and responding to system failures, it does not provide incentives to 
provide performance that is anything more than merely acceptable. 
Even when a system is functioning well, there will often be a range 
of performance within the definition of acceptable in which it may 
be operating. There may be a minimum level at which a certain 
characteristic becomes unacceptable and deemed to be in a failure 
state, but the users will benefit if these characteristics rise above those 
minimum thresholds. Likewise, two similar handpumps may both 
be producing sufficient water for user needs, but the level of effort 
required to abstract that water may be very different, depending on 
the condition of the pump components. If system performance can 
be comprehensively measured then this permits a broader array of 
monitored standards that can guide clearer incentives in service level 
contracts. In the absence of incentives aligning with measurable and 
enforceable maintenance service levels, some handpump users may 
reap the benefits of the more diligent mechanic or better quality 
components, though if performance differences are not acknowledged 
there is a real risk that service levels will vary as classic ‘principal–
agent’ problems emerge (Hope et al., 2012b).
Measuring certain performance characteristics, preferably contin-
uously, also opens up the possibility of predictive maintenance. If 
performance characteristics are understood, or historical data is 
analysed and statistical models are made, it is often possible to predict 
a system failure. For example, before an electric pump fails as a result 
of worn bearings or bushes, it may start to vibrate in a distinctive 
known manner, so monitoring this vibration will allow the pump to 
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be replaced in a controlled manner before it completely fails. Outside 
the water sector, low-cost remote monitoring is also demonstrating 
its worth. CareMore, a US healthcare provider, uses wireless scales 
and blood pressure cuffs to remotely monitor its patients/customers 
on a daily basis, enabling medical interventions to take place before 
serious events, such as heart attacks, occur. As well as reducing the 
catastrophic impacts to the patients this reduces high downstream 
costs associate with hospitalization and surgery (Main and Slywotzky, 
2011). In this way the increase in the speed of data flow made possible 
by new technologies creates a much tighter feedback loop, which 
allows for a step change in the way data can be used. The monitoring 
of a rural water supply system, under what could be called a traditional 
project model, will often be too late to benefit the users of the system 
that is being evaluated. A report will be produced on how the system 
is doing which will hopefully inform future projects and investments 
decisions. Slow data leads to slow improvement with the risk that 
system features, good or bad, become ‘baked-in’. With near real time 
performance data integrated into the management of a system, a 
‘monitoring and evaluation leading to lessons learnt’ paradigm gives 
way to a ‘surveillance-response’ paradigm. On top of the simple speed 
and efficiency benefits gained from simply knowing things faster, 
continual improvement and learning is possible, for both technical 
and institutional issues. This tighter feedback loop also allows 
more flexibility as the effect of different decisions or management 
rules is known quickly and can be changed accordingly, rather than 
sticking, quite rationally, to the risk averse ‘if it ain’t broke don’t fix 
it’ mentality. 
Closed turn-key systems, such as the LIFELINK offered by 
Grundfos, have system surveillance built into their design, so that 
engineers locally or internationally can monitor performance. This 
is very much the exception in the rural water sector rather than 
the rule and is possible because a communications link to manage 
the billing and system monitoring was designed in from the start. 
Moving beyond purely technical aspects, what LIFELINK is now 
offering is guaranteed water services for an agreed number of years. 
This service level approach is redefining operational and economic 
performance for users and investors. Water Health International and 
Sarvajal also have offerings that provide new water infrastructure 
with mobile technology designed in. Other initiatives are also 
exploring the potential of automated monitoring of existing rural 
water infrastructure. Oxford University is developing and trialling a 
system that records hourly pump usage, reporting this information to 
a central server via SMS (Thomson et al., 2012). As well as its primary 
aim of automatically flagging pump breakages in near real-time, the 
hope is that accurate usage patterns and approximate volumetric 
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usage figures can be generated with finer temporal precision than 
is currently possible to generate without frequent, expensive field 
surveys. Portland State University is currently running field trials on 
a universal, low-cost, automated monitoring system for development 
projects that uses the mobile phone network for communications. 
This multi-purpose modular design is being adapted to monitor water 
projects.
Accountability
In the rural water sector much of the investment and service provision 
is driven externally rather than in direct response to local user needs. 
In a situation where the customers (governments/donors) are not the 
same as the consumers (water users), the usual two-way relationship 
between customer/consumer and service provider does not exist. The 
resulting three-way relationship leads to an information asymmetry. 
The customer, who has contractual or financial power over the service 
provider, whether a private supplier or other government agency, will 
not know the level of service that the consumer is being provided 
with, unless specific effort is made to find out. In such a situation 
it is also unlikely that the consumers have a choice of service 
provider, and thus have little power of their own to incentivize them 
to improve service levels. If performance data is made available to 
those who are contracting the service provider, contractual incentives 
for high performance and penalties for poor performance can be 
imposed. Performance data of well-functioning systems can provide 
insights into how the system is used which can inform longer-term 
investment and policy decisions. When there are systems that are 
similar but geographically dispersed, benchmarking of different 
providers of comparable systems can be made by a regulatory body. 
Performance benchmarking has long been done by regulators of 
utilities across the world, including urban water supply in Africa (e.g. 
NWASCO in Zambia, or WASREB in Kenya); however, benchmarking 
has yet to become a significant feature of rural water supply. 
That central governments, donors, and NGOs are driving investment 
in and are implementing rural water supply projects brings out 
another reason why the monitoring of performance rather than of 
failure is essential. Governments have obligations to provide water to 
their people, which are derived from constitutional obligations and 
national policy, or shaped by international laws and norms. General 
Comment 15 (UN Economic and Social Council, 2003) builds on the 
Economic Social and Cultural (ESC) Covenant (1966) and states nine 
core obligations that fall upon state parties. Of these, a number are 
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also be noted that 37(c) refers to the obligation ‘to monitor the extent 
of the realization, or the non-realization, of the right to water’. While 
General Comment 15 is not a binding document and obligations 
under the ESC Covenant are qualified by the ‘progressive realization’ 
clause, they are increasingly being observed. As well as monitoring 
being an essential management tool for delivering improved water 
services, it is arguably an obligation itself. This may have practical 
implications for rural water policies. Community management and 
self-supply may be the most effective means of providing rural water 
services to the rural poor, and government policy and legislation may 
reflect this, for example in Zambia. However, core obligation 37(c) 
suggests that this delegation of management responsibility down to 
local communities does not absolve governments of their responsibil-
ities to their citizens. This point is reiterated in Human Rights Council 
Resolution A/HRC/RES/15/9 (2010) that states that ‘the delegation 
of the delivery of safe drinking water and/or sanitation services 
to a third party does not exempt the State from its human rights 
obligations’. Therefore the implementation of arms-length policies 
must be monitored and governments must provide necessary support 
to ensure that safe water supplies are sustained into the future.
In the case where much of rural water investment is through NGOs 
and bilateral aid, organizations have obligations to deliver project 
outcomes to their donors, who in the case of government donors 
have corresponding obligations to taxpayers to spend aid budgets 
effectively. For example, the current UK government has committed 
to meeting agreed funding targets for international development. 
However, especially in a climate of budget cuts and austerity, this is 
not a universally popular policy, and so the need to deliver value for 
money in aid is increasingly important. Previously, in the absence of 
1) much rigorous scrutiny from donors; and 2) the ability to conduct 
meaningful long-term monitoring at reasonable cost, the one-year-on 
project report with inevitably glowing results was the norm. 
Amongst others, Breslin (2010) eloquently and robustly critiques this 
short-term project mentality, echoing insights by Therkildsen (1988) 
into ‘watering white elephants’ in Africa a generation earlier. With 
aid effectiveness driving competition between sectors, a pound spent 
on rural water supply has to demonstrate impacts and outcomes 
comparable to a pound spent on a health or education project. By 
their nature, water programmes only deliver benefits in the future if 
boreholes, pumps, and standpipes continue to work into the future. So 
to compete with, say, a measles vaccination campaign which provides 
a long-term benefit through a one-off action, we must ensure that 
water supply projects remain effective over time, and be able to prove 
that effectiveness.
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Conclusion
Falkenmark (1982) identified at the start of the International Drinking 
Water Supply and Sanitation Decade that operations and maintenance 
problems would become increasingly of concern. Thirty years on 
we are still struggling with them. Fortunately the paradigm of buy, 
install, train, handover to the community, and then head back to the 
capital city for sundowners appears long dead. Effective monitoring 
of rural water supply projects is rapidly becoming the ‘new normal’. 
Monitoring is required for the long-term management of projects, for 
accountability to donors and users, and to inform future investment 
decisions. Fortunately, the mobile phone revolution across Africa 
provides an opportunity for the quality of monitoring to increase 
by orders of magnitude at relatively low cost. The marginal cost of 
sending data across hundreds or thousands of miles of Landcruiser-
killing terrain by text message or GPRS (General Packet Radio Service) 
is negligible, allowing for a move towards continuous monitoring and 
surveillance. The ever-decreasing cost of ICT enables us to generate 
and crunch these data cheaply, and social media allows us to quickly 
disseminate information to users, donors, and other stakeholders.
However, the history of rural development projects provides a 
veritable graveyard of examples of well-intentioned projects and 
innovations that have met harsh reality and been found wanting. 
Care must be taken in understanding the nature of the monitoring 
system being implemented: its strengths and weaknesses; what is 
explicit vs. what is only implicit; the reliability and currency of the 
data. Monitoring systems can produce a deluge of data whose quality 
must be assessed, so that only valid conclusions are drawn from it. In 
the case of automated systems, they may be telling us objective facts, 
but are these really what we need to know? In the case of crowd-
sourced data, has the system design fully accounted for existing 
social structures and norms? What are the reporting biases of those 
using the system? As the amount of monitoring data we can generate 
increases, along with the ways in which we can process, manipulate, 
and present data, understanding what is behind the final ‘product’, 
whether a map, chart, or graphic, becomes more and more important 
and less immediately apparent. We must know what we are explicitly 
monitoring and what we are merely inferring, even if that inference 
is most likely correct. Rather like water, low-quality data is preferable 
to no data, and can be extremely useful, but the consequences of 
assuming it is of high quality and using it accordingly can be fatal.
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